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Mouraine R. Baker

South D^ota State University

University of Iowa
ABSTRACT

Reference group theory posits that people attempt to identify themselves with
groups that are esteemed in order to enhance theirsenseofself-worth. However,
it is not uncommon that actors mayfind themselves being identified with, or
identifying with, stigmatized groups or categories. In order to avoid the
personally pejorative implications of these associations, these actors often
engage in various strategies that take aform similartoaccountswhich attempt to
neutralize possible stigma. Two fundamental normalizations, disidentification
and deflectedstigma are presentedand compared toprevious articulations in the
literature ofstigma management.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years wehave seen self-esteem (orlack thereof) proffered as an
explanation for various forms ofbehavior inrealms ranging from pop psychology to
social policy. More scientifically, it hasbeen convincingly argued thatthe desire to
optimize the evaluative component ofoursense ofselfis a primary motive ofsocial
actionAnteraction (Wells & Marwell 1976). Indeed, reference group theory suggests
that weatten^ttoidentify ourselves with groups or social categories that enhance our
sense of self-worth (Abrams & Hogg 1988; Mannheim 1966; Sherif& Sherif 1964;
Sherwood 1965; Singer 1981). Specifically, Eitzen (1985, p. 106) has noted the
toidency for a . p^chological identification with thegroups to which individuals
belong (membership gi oups), oi to which ihey want tobelong (reference gioups)."
Also, Abrams and Brown (1989, p. 311) assert: "When a particular social
categorizationis salient, the individual will be motivated to maintain or raise his or her

self-esteem by promoting or enhancing evaluation of that category...
HowevCT, forone reason or another we often find ourselves identified with,
or identifying with, groups or categories that arenotespecially esteemed-indeed,
these groups may be stigmatized in one sense or another. When the criterion for

presumed identificaticai with these groups orcategories isbased on appearance, it can
beparticularly pernicious (Stone 1986b). Under these circumstances, wemay seek
tomanage this stigma using oneor another verbal/linguistic neutralizations (Gofihnan
1963; Sykes & Matza 1981).
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Thepurposeof thispaperis an attempt to articulate andelaborate two types
of these normalizations which wc like to refer to generically as "yes, buts." Ailcr
presentation of germane theoretical perspectives and the essence of these
neutralizations, a comparison will be made with other such attempts to engage in
what Gofi&nan (1968)referred to as "face-work" thatare alrearfy extant in the literature
relevantto potentially stigmatizing identifications.
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

In a basic discussion of status processes, Hyman (1942) posited that actors

compare theirownsocial positions to reference groups,otheractors, categories, and
collective others. The result of this comparison process has implications for future
behavior as actors will, through this process,determine how close their own status
matches thatof the referent(s). The assumption is that actors focus on their referents
as exemplars of desired status and consciously direct their behavior toward that
diqDlayed bythereferents. While not directly suggested by Hyman, the inference can
be drawn that this status emulation will be noted by others and that actors' successes
(or lack thereof) in this will be assessed by others.

Ofthetypes of referents delineated byHyman, that of thereference grouphas
been utilized most frequently in the theoretical and empirical literature (Hyman
& Singer 1968; Schmitt1972). In a tome thatdiscussed themultiple reference other
concepts tnhich hadbeenemployed inpastworks, Schmitt (1972) noted thepointthat
multiple concepts offered an overlying reference other orientation withthe possibility
of producing a number of reference othertheories linkingreferents to behavior.
The reference group as a concept is dellned as a group that inlluenccs an
actor's overt or covert behavior (Schmitt 1972). Groups in which the actor has no
membership can also serve as reference groups (Shibutani 1961), while groups in
which actors have membership mayhave no influence over their behavior. While
the reference group need not have an empirical existence (see Rokeach 1964),it is
defined asa group by actors and, once defined as such, influences theirbehavior. The
reference group, as defmed by any actor, is a socially constructed reality, not
exclusively an empirical phenomenon (Schmitt 1972).
Membership status in a reference group is defined as beingrecognized as
having a membership affiliation with that group (Schmitt 1972). While Merton
(1957) made it clear that both the actor and others must recognize the actor as a
member of the group, Schmitt leaves the question of recognition by others of the
actor'smembership rather uncertain. Yetformany groups that are socially defined,
membership is determined for most by physical characteristics (race, gender, age,
etc.) or assumable characteristics (e.g. attire, symbols and demeanor) that have

obvious meanings. These characteristics arerecognized by others which makes it
possible for actors to be considered by others as members of specific groups which
these actorsmaynot identify,andfrom whichtheymay not draw their values.
Singer (1981) suggests that for greater clarity the concept of reference
group should be limited to action that deals with self- and social evaluations. Self-and
social evaluations are used by actors in two ways. First, the evaluations expressed by
others are applied by actors to themselves and second, the reference groups are used
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the actors as a means of evaluating either the selfor others through a process of

comparison. In order for an actor to accept the evaluations of others, those others
must be accepted as normative and evaluative referents. Inother words, in orderto

be accepted, those evaluations must come from a source that the actor accepts as
having the ability tomake meaningful evaluations. These evaluations, whether from
specific others or the evaluation process generally, can then influence the future

behavior oftheactor. Again, the implication isthat actors determine their referents,
and accept those others as having the ability to pass judgment on these actors'
behaviors.

Consequently, evaluations that actors accept as meaningful can afiect their
self-esteem (see Rosenberg & Simmons 1972). Positiveevaluations can be said to

increase their self-esteem, while negative evaluations may very well decrease selfesteem (Singer 1981). As Gecas (1991) and others suggest, self-esteem can be

considered a motivation for behavior (Wells &Marwell 1976). Working from the
assumption that having a selfproduced by reflexive action leadsto behaviorthat is

intended to maintain and enhance its state, Gecas posits three motivations for
behavior; self-esteem, self-efficacy, and authenticity. He asserts that self-esteem is the
most responsive to the interpersonal domain ofreflected appraisals. Ergo, evaluations
oftheactor's behavior, and therefore of the actor's self, affect that actor'sself-esteem
which, in turn, calls out overt or covert behavior intended to either maintain or

increase alevel ofself-esteem. Negative evaluations, especially when determined to
be coming froma respected source, may wellelicit behavior intended to alter the effect

ofthis evaluation onthe actor's self-esteem (Crosby 1976; Singer 1981).
Pejorative evaluations may also affect behavior when these evaluations

assume group membership for an actor. As previously noted, group or categoiy
membership isnot alw^s achoice for many actors, and may be ascribed. Others may
ascnbe membership for certain actors by noting physical orassumed characteristics,
andjudge these actors by reference to the groups orcategories in which membership
is presumed. When actors are indeed members ofthe group used by others as a
referent, negative evaluations may affect their self-esteem, irrespective ofwhether or
not they themselves tend to personally identify with this category orgroup, oruse it as
a source of self-evaluation and/or value.s,

Asmentioned inthe before, actors seem toprefer tobe identified as members

ofgroups orcategories that will enhance their sense ofself-worth (Abrams &Hogg
1988; Mannheim 1966; Schfnitt 1972; Sherif&Sherif 1964; Sherwood 1965; Singer
1981). P^chological identification with groups to which actors belong was noted by
Eitzen (1985). When the reference group orcategory becomes salient, actors may be
motivated tomaintain orincrease their self-esteem by raising the social evaluation of
the group itself(Abrams &Brown 1989). This suggests that when judgments offered
ofthe membership group are pejorative, actors may bemotivated todeal with these
evaluations whether ornot they accept this membership group as areferent other.

In their discussion ofstatus characteristics and expectation states, Berger
and associates (1985) note that various social groups and categories are both

differentialfy defined and evaluated. Physical characteristics such as race and gender
are fairly easily defined and rated asmore or less desirable. While other definitions

based on acquired or assumable characteristics such as clothing or behavior may also
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be used inmaking such identifications and evaluations, these are lessreadily apparent

in either their status orvalue. Nevertheless, accepting that actors' self-esteem may
stemfi"om their group or collective identifications, placing a negative evaluation on
these actors as a result ofidentifying them asamember ofa disparaged group may
require seme reaction ontheir part inorder tomanage the potentially damaging effect
on their self-esteem.

While these reactions could take a number offonns (a change inbehavior,
a changein cognitions, etc.), as other authors have done, we will focus on reactions

that are essentially verbal attempts to neutralize these potentially pejorative
identifications (Hall &Hewitt 1970; Hewitt &Hall 1973; Scully 1990). Now, for
the first of the "yes. but(s)."
DISCOUNTING MEMBERSHIP IN DISPARAGED GROUPS

Certainly there are groups orcategories within oursociety that actors may
be part of, yet which due to the low esteem in which these groups are generally
held, those actors may, as much as possible, eschew idenlificalion with these veiy
same groups. Therefore, we like to refer to this "yes, but" as disidentification.
Prior to the advent of the "Black Pride" movement of the 1960s,it wasnot

uncommon to find people who, though they would be considered black bymembers

of the dominant racial category in the United States, were able (and actively
attempted) to "pass" as white due to their imcharacteristically black features
(Gof&nan 1963). These actors also tended tobecharacterized bydisavowal ofsuch
membership in that racial category and behavior that was more stereotypically
"white." On a related note, the first author remembers one of his students who,
while it was abundantly clear that this student's race was black, behaved in a

stereotypically "white" fashion and disavowed membership in that racial category
since he was adopted into and raised by a white family, and said that he was
nothing like "those" people. Indeed, he expressed typically racist attitudes toward
blacks (e.g. they're lazyandhave criminal tendencies).
Similarly, we've fotmd that many college women seem to believethat it is

necessary to tell others that "I'm not a feminist." Apparently their age and social
status lead others to automatically cast them in that role, and with the long-time

public opinion being somewhat disparaging of feminists (and recent populist
demagogues like Rush Limbaugh referring to them asfemi-nazis) they feel a need
to verbally neutralize their possible association with this category ofwomen.
Currently, there is a considerable amount ofevidence thattheaged inour
society are disparaged, and that age is considered a weak stigma at the present time
(Matthews 1979). Consequently, wecansee assorted attempts byolder persons to

"disidentify" with thai age status by dressmg and behavmg "young", purchasmg
products that purport toreverse or minimize the physical signs ofaging (Oil ofClay
and Grecian Formula). Stone (1986a) has certainly noted theimportance ofage and
appearance as they relate to the perception of the self. Those attempting to deny
their actual age status may also eschew some apparent benefits that go with accepting
the designation of old (e.g. senior citizen discounts etc.). Furthermore, olderactors

with the mtent ofdisidentifying themselves with an apparently stigmatized age group
https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol10/iss1/5
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often engage in verbal neutralizations of their membership in this category (e.g.
"You're only as old as you feel"). Finally, studiesof older persons which ha\c asked
them to categorize themselves in terms of their age status have found that most do not
ratethemselves asolduntil longpasttheageatwhichthey are consideredold by either
socialpolicyor convention (Biiltena& Powers 1978;Baum & Boxley 1983).
This tendency toward disidentification seems to be a reflection of the older
actors' health, whereby those who are chronologically, but not physically old, may
attempt to pass for a more esteemed age status. Indeed, a study of the attempted
integration of two groups of older persons concluded that one group manifest this
disidentification in its resistance to such integration due to the fact that the other
group was more stereotypically old (sicker and poorer). Thus, integration of these
groups would have made it more difficult for the members of the healthier one to
continue to denytheirown agedness (Magnuson-Martinson 1991). Recently, a study
of nursing homes asserts that organizations themselves are stigmatized—largely due
to their clientele, the old and the sick (Schrader 1993,Wolfe 1994).
Others who have notable health concems may also be stigmatized.
Attempts to "pass" and disidentify in various ways have been noted by researchers

examining people living with AIDS (Sandstrom 1990; Weitz 1980). Indeed,
Sandstrom notes that sometry to disidentify by pointing out that they are "innocent
victims" of this disease, having contracted it through legitimate behavior (e.g.
transfusion or heterosexual relations), rather than having exposed themselves to it
through homosexuality or intravenous druguse. Similarly, Cain (1994) notes that
AIDS serviceorganizations themselvesare stigmatized.
Toward the other end of the life course, those in later adolescence often

feel a need to disidentify with their parents in some fashion, smce ihiough their
lives tothis point th^ have generally been perceived andtreated as if they aresimply
extensions of their progenitors. Additionally, those adolescents who, perhaps nonnormatively, do not rebel against their elders may believe that it is necessary to
verbally normalize their position byaveiring as they arenot like those teenagers who
are looked downupon by older, andpresumably morerespectable, members of the
community.

Speaking of respectable members of the community, in their study of the
homeless, Snow and Anderson (1987, p. 1349) quote from one oftheir respondents
who seems to be engaging in this type of verbal neutralization. "I'm not like the
other guys who hangout down at the Salvation Array, If you want to know about

street people, I cantell you about them; butyou can't really learn about street people
from studyingme, because I'm different."

Similarly, while not specifically noted in ourread of Scully's (1990) book
on the linguistic neutralizations of convicted rapists, a disidentification approach
would sound like this. "Yeah, well I'm not like ffiose other guys. I didn't jump out
of the bushes and attack some unsuspecting woman. I'm in here because this girlI
asked out was leading me on andthen said no. But shereally meant yes. Sowhat if
it got alittle rough. How was I to know herroommate was going to walk in-then the
girl screams rape. I'mnot a real rapist likethose other guys!"
Avariation onthe issue ofattempting toavoid the potential stigma associated
with some of one's membership groups or categories may be found in some of the
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accouterments of popular culture, particularly those which announce the message:
"Don't blame me, I.. .The bumper stickers, buttons and knit pullover tops with
slogans of this sort seem to have as their whole purpose the attempt to disidentify
oneself with a group or categorythat may be subject to stigma due to some action
attributed to that association, and these accouterments can be seen as what have been

referred to asidentity documents or,particularly, disidentifiers (Goffinan 1963). Such
aimouncements seem to implicitly proclaim: "I may look like one of them, but I'm
really not!" Consequently, thesewouldseem to be a formof presentation of the self
(GofiBnan 1959)in appearance thatreflects the "yes, but"of disidentification. Blinde
and Taub (1992) note thai in female athletes' attempts to manage the stigma of

presumed lesbianism they often presentstereotypically "feminine" appearances.
Whilethe aforementioned disparagedstatus of the aged (or other stigmatized
groups) in oursociety maycontribute toward discounting one's membership in a social
category, there is another possible responseto thatpotential stigma—redefining the
status of thedisparaged groups. Older actors whorespond to questions about their age
by stating: "I am 65 (or so) years young" are apparently attempting to renegotiate
eithertheireligibility for thelabel of old, or the meaning of the status itself. Elliot and
associates (1990) inake noteof similarnormalization attempts. Attempts such as this
bring us to the next neutralization technique.
RATIONAUZmC IDENTIFICATION WITH DISPARAGED GROUPS

In the previous section we explored the normalization technique of
disidentification as used by actors whowishedto negate theirpotentially stigmatizing
association with groups ofwhich th^ actually werepart. In thisone, we will examine
howactors may attempt torenegotiate the potentially stigmatizing statusof categories
with which they do identify—even if they are not actually membersof those groups.
Sometimeswe findthatactors w^io m^ be part of a group or category which
bears some sort of stigma may engage in verbal or behavioral clarifications that

attempt redefine the esteem(or lack thereof) in which the group itselfis held. Those
older actors who evince the verbal technique noted at the end of the last section, as
wellas thosewhomightprovide "facts and figures" about the contributions of "elders"
in oursociety—especially as compared to otherage categories—are asserimg a diflerent
valuethanis generally conceded to this group by other age categories. Thus, they are

attempting toundercut the generally inferred stigma of the agestatuswith which they

ident^.
Underother circumstances, actors may (for onereason or another, e.g. selfconsistency) choose to identify with groups of which they arenot part, yet be aware
that those groups are not generally held in high esteem—at least at that point
in time. As Hewitt and Stokes (1986, p. 367) note: "Expressions of a different sort

areemployed when the individual knows the outcome of his actwill be discrediting,
but is neverthelessstrongly committed to the act."
Such acts can be something
as simple as wearing the paraphernalia of a local sportsteam. Much has been made
ofthetendency ofspOTts fans to identify with successful teams andthus,enhance their
own self-esteem by basking in "reflected glory" (Burger 1985; Cialdini et ^ 1976;
Sigelman 1986). But (loyalty aside—see Farris 1994), what is it that enables die-hard
https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol10/iss1/5
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fans ofteams such as the Chicago Cubs to root for their hapless heroes ad infinitum?
After all, some (Ecenbarger 1995, p. 4E.) have asserted that.. the fans of

consistently losing teams can go through something similar tothe five stages ofdeathrelated grief

"

Beyond the fact that unsuccessful sports team may have a more everyman
or plain folks appeal to them, it would seem that the ability of these fans to
successfully "deflect stigma" would enable those who identify with these to teams
to continue to do sowithout having their self-esteem suffer too tremendously. It
would be hard to say whether this might be indicative of the first (denial) or last
(acceptance) stageofdeath-related grief.

The first author remembers being personally elated several years back
when the Denver Broncos lost their fourth Super Bowl in four attempts. This
elation was not so much the result ofbeing the conference loyalist that he is (and
thus, providing the opportunity to bask in reflected glory) as itwas the opportunity
to once again reveal his identification with the Minnesota Vikings who, while
stigmatized nationally because they had lost four Super Bowls in four attempts (see
Reusse 1995,Souhan 1995), had comemuch clo.ser to the winner'.s score in each case

than had theBroncos. Ergo, he had a rejoinder todeflect stigma if anyone should
disparage his identification with his local professional football team. At the initial
writing ofthis paper hewas eagerly hoping that 1994's Super Bowl would beboth a

rematch and repeat of1993's, sothat he could favorably compare his Vikings with
Buffalo's Bills, who would have lost four consecutive Super Bowls under those
circumstances. Atleast his Vikings didn't losefour in a row! As we all should know

by now, his patience was rewarded, and his ability to neutralize this potentially
pejorative identificationwas enhanced.

Other such examples fiompopular culture can befound in the recent troubles

of such celebrities as Michael Jackson and O.J. Simpson. Ifsomething like anticonformity (Levin &Levin 1988) induces actors to identify with Guns 'n Roses' singer
Axel Rose (aconvicted felon), they can deflect the stigma that might beattached to
this bynoting that: "At least he didn't bugger boys like Michael did!" Orifone ofour
beloved Vikings runs afoul of thelaw, our rejoinder can be that: "At least he didn't

whack his wife" (in several senses ofthat word). As has been noted, "Happiness is
typically associated with comparing favorably with others " (Stephan &Stephan
1990, p. 175).

Finally, Sandstrom (1994) notes that persons unaffected by AIDS may
identify with its victims by virtue of being family, fiiends, or advocates for the
afflicted. Ergo, they may attempt todeflect the stigma otherwise directed atthose who
have it.

Consequently, when identification with apotentially stigmatized group of
which one isnot amember would generally result in personal stigmaiizalion and thus,
pejorative effects on one's self-esteem and not the reflected gloiy which usually is the
basis for identification with groups ofwhich one isnot a member, and one is able to
somehow redefine the esteem inwhich this category one identifies with isheld, then
this "yes, but" ismost appropriately refemed to as "deflected stigma." We believe that

the old notion of"misery loves company" may play aminor part here, but itwould
seemmoreimportant to be able to pointto someone whohas reason to be evenmore
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miserable ifone istobe effective inmanaging the potential stigma ofidentifying with
disparagedgroups or categories.
While this neutralization is very similar to that which characterizes
attempts toredefine the disparaged status ofgroups of whichone is part,identification

with one's membership groups is notquite thesamething as that which goeson in
"reflected gloiy", and so lacks thespecific circumstances necessary toprovide for the
symmetrical linguistic polarity inherent inthe designation "deflected stigma." Ergo,
we havedeemed the two "yes, but" concepts articulatedherein, "disidentification" and
"deflected stigma" to be similar, but somewhat different.
RELEVANCE OF "YES, BUTS" TO RELATED CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Both of these are, for the most part, linguistic devices which attempt to
manage the stigma possible due to real or presumed (on either the actor's or the
observers' parts) identification with less-than esteemed groups or categories. Thus,
as linguistic devices that attempt tomanage stigma, they share some characteristics

with such previously articulated concepts as accounts (Scott & Lyman 1986),
techniques ofneutralization (Sykes&Matza 1981), and disclaimers (Hewitt

Stokes

1986).

While Scott and Lyman (1986, p. 357) write that: "Every account is a
manifestation of the underlying negotiation of identities;" they also note (p. 343)
that: "An account is a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to
evaluative inquiry." Therefore, the "yes, but" ofdisidentification would not quite be the
same-due to it being the result oftheactor being automatically identified with some
group or category based onpersonal appearance rather than action. While attempts
at deflected stigma follow an action that is reflective of one's identification with a

group or category, it is the identification with that group or category that is
stigmatizing, not the action itself. Therefore, while deflected stigma is more like a
"justification" type of account than is disidentification, it seems to not be quite the
same thing.

Sykes and Matza's (1981) "techniques of neutralization" similarly are

attempts to verbally normalize actions perform^ by juvenile delinquents. However,
unlikedeflected stigma, where the initial actions reflect the actor's identification with

a reference group or category, the actions of these youngsters qualify them for
membership in the juvenile delinquent category. Again, our other "yes, but" of
disidentification is theresult ofone speaking or acting in ways which indicate thatone
chooses not to be considered part of a group or category into which one would
otherwise be automatically cast, simply on the basis of some aspect of physical
appearance. Thus, once again,whilethere are similaritiesbetween our fi^atemal twin

concepts ofdisidentification/deflected stigma and the techniques ofneutralization, they
appear to not entirely overlap.
Finally, Hewitt and Stokes (1986, p. 364) write that"... disclaimers are

prospective, defining thefuture inthe present, creating interpretations ofpotentially
problematic events intended tomake them unproblematic as they occur." While the
normalizations used to deflect stigma may be seen in this light, deflected stigma
revolves mostly around identifications rather than actions, and therefore, seems to
https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol10/iss1/5
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remain abit different from the notion inherent inthe definition ofdisclaimers. Again,
disidentification ispredicated on attempts tolinguistically neutralize attributions that
are automatically based on one's present appearance, apparently not some future
appearance, andis, therefore, seemingly different from a disclaimer.

Consequently, while the herein articulated "yes, buts" are like previous
typifications of linguistic attempts to manage potentially problematic identities,
they seem tobring something new tothe language of"facework". Ifour esteemed and
more learned colleagues fail to share our opinions on (and assertions of) this,
we can probably maintain our self-esteem by retreating to .some of the exi.sting
typologies to manage any stigma that might fall on those failing toprovide convincing
scholarly evidence and argument for their claims. Sykes and Matza's (1981)
"condemning the condemners" would seem tobea likely rejoinder!
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